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Abstract 
In this review article we explore the growing body of literature on the subject of trust in the 
field of international relations. We argue that the international level represents a unique 
challenge for trust research. This is so because some of the most pressing problems facing the 
world today require the development of trusting relationships internationally. In addition, the 
international environment is structurally different from domestic or personal relations on 
which much of the trust literature has focused so far. We identify three main strands of trust 
literature in international relations – rationalist, social and psychological. We not only note the 
contributions these have made to understanding the role of trust internationally, but also 
highlight areas where more research is needed. Particularly, we argue that this includes 
theorising processes of trust-building, the identification of trusting relationships and the 
development of a normative case for trust among states. 
Introduction 
The international level presents the greatest challenge to trust studies. The most pressing 
problems facing humanity, be they climate change, environmental degradation, or nuclear 
proliferation with the concomitant threat of a nuclear war cannot be solved within the 
confines of individual nation-states and demand international cooperation. These problems 
fundamentally foreground the existence of trust and distrust among states, the ways in which 
trust can facilitate or hinder states’ encounters, and the possibility of establishing and 
maintaining trusting relationships among large collectives. It is of crucial importance to 
understand the role of trust in these dynamics from both theoretical and practical points of 
view. In short, a strong case exists for why the emerging field of trust studies should take a 
substantial interest in international relations and, vice versa, why the field of international 
relations ought to incorporate and develop insights generated by trust researchers.  
Even a cursory look at the bilateral or multilateral relationships between states reveals 
a range of statements by world leaders concerning both trust and distrust. These suggest that 
they are aware of the significance of trust in solving these major problems, yet also 
understand its risks. For instance, prior to the Copenhagen climate change summit in 2009, the 
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon spoke about the need ‘to build trust between 
developing and industrialized countries’ (Ban, 2009). Shortly after his election in June 2013, 
the Iranian president Hassan Rouhani spoke about the ‘many ways to build trust’ with the 
West ("Rouhani vows to 'build trust' with West," 2013). And yet, even before the tentative 
deal concerning the limits on the Iranian nuclear research was reached in November 2013, the 
US Secretary of State John Kerry went out of his way to stress that ‘nothing we do [with Iran] is 
going to be based on trust.’ (Steinhauer, 2013)  
In addition to these appeals, we can observe formal or informal declarations of 
trusting relationships between specific states, or, on the contrary, denunciations of other 
states as untrustworthy.  We can also find instances where states routinely cooperate with 
each other to the benefit of all concerned, but at the same time harbour distrust over whether 
other states involved might engage in free-riding or even defect from the agreement. Though 
almost all states maintain active militaries to repel external threat, suggesting a general degree 
of distrust of at least some states, we can simultaneously identify groups of states among 
whom trust is so high and trusting relationships so robust that war between them has become 
unthinkable.1  All this reinforces our claim that the dynamics of trust and distrust play an 
important role in how states relate to and interact with each other.   
Despite this, the subject of trust within the study of international relations, both 
theoretically and empirically, is still at a nascent, if rapidly developing, stage. With rare 
exceptions, until about a decade ago the international relations scholarship by and large 
overlooked trust as an explanatory factor in the relations between states. Likewise, trusting 
relationships rarely feature as something to be explained, irrespective of the numerous calls 
from practitioners regarding the importance of trust-building. Some scholars, such as John 
Mearsheimer, argue that this oversight is purposeful, claiming that there is ‘little room for 
trust among states because a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed.’ 
(Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 12) This is allegedly due to the unique characteristics of the 
international system, which makes the establishment and sustenance of trusting relationships 
between states much more difficult than between persons or organisations acting within the 
domestic sphere.  Nonetheless, even Mearsheimer’s sceptical assessment does not completely 
rule out the possibility of trust among states. It merely implies that it is rarely present.    
Increasingly, scholars in the field of international relations have come to pay greater 
attention to the concept of trust and the role it might play in interstate affairs. Authors have 
found inspiration in various strands of the literature produced by trust researchers and have 
sought to apply it to a range of phenomena in international politics. Therefore, one goal of this 
review essay is to provide a thorough and critical overview of this growing literature. The flow 
in this exchange of ideas has, so far, been rather unidirectional from trust studies to 
international relations. We believe that drawing the focus of trust researchers to the 
international level will generate two-way traffic. Thus, another objective of this article is to 
highlight and explore the particular challenges and barriers posed to trust and trusting 
relationships by the structure of the international system. In this way, we want to encourage 
trust researchers to think further about the scope of applicability of their conceptual and 
                                                          
1
 A group of states among whom warfare becomes unthinkable is known as a security community (Adler 
& Barnett, 1998; Booth & Wheeler, 2008; K. W. Deutsch et al., 1957).   
theoretical tools. Finally, our third aim is to suggest some possible directions for future 
research at the intersection between trust studies and international relations.  
The review essay reflects our objectives and proceeds in three parts. In the first part, 
we explain why trust has so long been ignored within international relations theory and why 
the international level poses unique challenges to the study of trust and trusting relations. In 
particular, we examine the problem of anarchy within the international system, which has led 
many to conclude, or perhaps outright assume, that trusting relations are impossible in 
international politics.  Second, we show how scholars have attempted to introduce the 
concept of trust into the study of international relations, a trend that has recently picked up in 
pace dramatically. We trace diverse conceptual sources in trust research and highlight 
strengths and weaknesses of various applications to the study of international politics. The 
third section articulates several questions concerning trust that we consider to be the most 
pressing at the international level and which researchers both in international relations and in 
trust studies should tackle. They pertain to the processes of trust-building, the ways in which it 
could be demonstrated whether globally or at least regionally trusting relationships are 
becoming more robust, and finally the normative desirability of trusting relationships among 
states. 
The overarching idea behind this review article is to facilitate interdisciplinary research 
between international relations and trust studies. Neglecting the international level would be a 
missed opportunity for the latter, while the former needs to think more carefully about the 
transformative potential that the concept of trust holds for dealing with thorny issues of 
international politics. The mutual engagement between the two fields promises strong 
potential for theoretical innovation as well as practical impact. 
Trust in a Condition of Anarchy 
The largest obstacle facing scholars who wish to theorise about trust in international politics 
stems from the idea of anarchy.  Within the field of international relations, anarchy denotes 
the absence of an overarching authority which could enforce rules, laws, and contracts.  This 
lack of a central arbiter for disputes and conflicts fundamentally differentiates the 
international system from domestic systems which are hierarchical due to the presence of a 
recognized authority, the government.   
The idea of anarchy magnifies the impact of uncertainty about the motives of others.  
In such a structural setting, each state is formally the equal of all the others entitled to act in 
its best interest.  The result is, as Kenneth Waltz (1979, p. 88) puts it, that ‘none is entitled to 
command; none is required to obey.’  Though states might sign treaties with each other, these 
do not have the same ordering force as domestic contracts do. States not only legislate for 
themselves the rules that they wish to obey, but in general are also ‘the supreme authority for 
interpreting and giving concrete meaning to their own legislative enactments.’ (Morgenthau, 
1978, p. 286)  Theorising relations between states given the condition of anarchy is the 
primary focus to most international relations theories. 
The implications of the idea of anarchy for the study of trust in international politics 
have long been accepted as obvious: anarchy prevents, or at least severely hinders, the 
formation of trusting relationships.  This assumption is often accompanied by the belief that 
states must mistrust each other.  Hoffman (2006, p. 35) summarises the argument noting that 
in the absence of a legitimate central power, the possibility that other states might act 
opportunistically, and have a good chance of getting away with it should they choose to do so, 
destroys any expectations of trustworthiness.  The consequences of such potential 
opportunism are severe. Misplaced trust could lead to a state being dominated by others or, in 
extreme cases, to its disappearance.  Even when states do not fear external domination, the 
state leadership could face increased domestic political competition arising from the political 
fallout of the misplaced trust. Either way, leaders are therefore wary to trust in the first place 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 8).  Thus, despite sharing a mutual interest in solving a dispute, states 
might not cooperate because they will fear the other might take advantage of their trusting 
attitude.   
The fear of misplaced trust can be modelled as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Unless the 
other state’s compliance can be monitored and a timely warning of cheating received, states 
will be wary of entering into agreements for fear of receiving the sucker payoff (Axelrod, 1990; 
Larson, 1997, p. 7).  Sometimes the monitoring needs to be so stringent that cooperation will 
be functionally impossible (Larson, 1997, p. 8).  Even if cooperation does take place, a state 
might still worry that the other state will take advantage of the recent reduction in tensions, 
particularly if defection is more costly later in the game. (Larson, 1997, p. 9). 
Another way to understand the problem of trusting under the condition of anarchy is 
through the concept of a security dilemma (Booth & Wheeler, 2008; Herz, 1950; Jervis, 1978).  
Attempts by states to make themselves feel more secure could lead other states to feel less 
secure.  As Booth and Wheeler show, states witnessing such activity, for instance a military 
build-up, face two dilemmas.  First, they must interpret whether the increased military 
capabilities are a result of defensive or offensive intentions; and second, they must decide how 
to respond. (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, pp. 4-5).   
The high costs of misinterpreting the other state’s intentions means that both states 
can fall into a security spiral where ever greater resources are spent on defence, but neither 
state feels more secure because of the insecurity generated by the attempts of the other to 
become secure (Jervis, 1976, pp. 58-113; Kydd, 2005, p. 13; Kydd & Walter, 2006, p. 57).  This 
is classically demonstrated in arms races, but can also apply to phenomena such as the late 
19th century competition for colonies or the desire of France to keep Germany weak after 
World War I.  In the security dilemma two states might have no hostile intentions, and yet, due 
to the lack of trust, could still end up in a dangerous situation that neither wanted.  
Anarchy in the international system also exacerbates domestic factors that can 
undermine the formation of trusting relationships between states.  Those holding antagonistic 
views of other states use the uncertainty inherent to anarchy to reinforce their arguments.  
John Tirman (2009) demonstrates the power of such adversarial narratives on the example of 
the highly contentious US-Iranian relationship since 1979.  Additionally, domestic elites can 
achieve internal unification and consolidation of power by projecting the image of the hostile 
outside environment. 
Trust and trusting relationships in international politics are therefore marked by a 
considerable structural pressure.  Trust researchers outside international relations rarely 
consider this pressure, because they typically examine processes within hierarchical realms.  
However, the nature and effects of international anarchy can be interpreted in various ways.  
Famously, Alexander Wendt argues that ‘anarchy is what states make of it.’ (Wendt, 1992) This 
means that states have some control over the characteristics of the international system in 
which they operate.  Depending on their actions, the international realm does not have to be 
characterized by unmitigated competition, which opens up the possibility of forging trusting 
relationships. 
The effects of anarchy are disputed.  What is indisputable is the difference between 
the anarchical international realm and hierarchical domestic settings.  Mistrust can become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy in both environments, but its consequences are far more dire in the 
former. It is therefore important that a growing number of studies have suggested both 
theoretical and empirical possibilities of trusting relationships between states.  For instance, 
trust scholars have shown the importance of trust in the founding of the United States and the 
European Community (Hoffman, 2006); Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation (Wheeler, 
2009); attempts to broker better relations between India and Pakistan (Wheeler, 2010); or in 
the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Booth & Wheeler, 2008; Hoffman, 2006).  The 
structural condition of anarchy cannot be used to rule out the possibility of trusting 
relationships a priori.  Instead, its effects should be studied further, applying appropriate 
insights from the broader trust research.    
Trust in International Relations: An Overview of Research 
The basic methodological question any review article must answer concerns the way in which 
it systematizes the body of literature under its scrutiny.  Is it more preferable to adopt a 
chronological or a typological approach? Each choice carries its own advantages and 
disadvantages.  Chronological presentation can offer an evolutionary perspective on the 
development of the literature, demonstrating connections and influences between 
subsequent contributions.  Grounded in the cumulative view of knowledge production, it can 
properly recognize the role of the initial explorers while at the same time pointing out the 
state of the art research.  But would it be a useful organizing tool for those instances when a 
body of literature has expanded rapidly within a short period of time and one can only identify 
at best weak cumulative tendencies?  For such occasions, the typological approach seems to 
be more appropriate.  It allows for grouping research according to conceptual, theoretical, or 
methodological criteria, reflecting the actual choices made by various researchers.  This 
enables one to spot tendencies in the literature even without any as yet apparent lineage.  
There is, however, a price to pay, namely the possibility of disagreement about the typological 
criteria.  Why, for instance, should the literature be divided on conceptual rather than 
methodological grounds? 
Mindful of these difficulties, this review essay adopts the typological approach.  It will 
be apparent to the readers that the research on trust produced in the field of international 
relations has grown very quickly.  Thus, while there are some historical legacies and early 
pioneers to be acknowledged, much of the literature has sprung up nearly simultaneously.  An 
additional reason for our preference is the fact that this allows us to map the strands of trust 
research in international relations back onto the main research threads in trust studies.  In 
short, we can trace sources on which international relations scholars have drawn.  Our main 
criterion for grouping the contributions together is the way in which the various authors treat 
the key concept of trust.  On this basis we outline three main approaches to the study of trust 
in relations among states.  The first theorizes trust as a type of rational choice calculation.  The 
second understands trust as a social phenomenon.  The third considers trust in its 
psychological dimensions.  Each approach is typically, but not exclusively, connected with 
specific theoretical and methodological choices which we note.  But we consider the particular 
conceptualizations of trust as the most distinctive feature. 
Trust as a Rational Choice Calculation 
Rational choice theory has long informed a strong tradition within the study of international 
relations.  It attempts to offer a solution to the problems of uncertainty and commitment, 
which states encounter under the conditions of international anarchy, by examining their 
expectations and preferences within matrices of rationally calculable pay-offs.  It relies heavily 
on formal modelling and, in some early instances, on laboratory behavioural experiments.  The 
pioneering research exploring the role of trust in this manner was conducted by Morton 
Deutsch and his collaborators in the late 1950s.  Working with the basic game theoretical 
model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Deutsch (1958, p. 270) made a powerful argument that 
‘there is no possibility for “rational” behaviour in it [the game] unless the conditions for 
mutual trust exist.’  Trust is the actor’s expectation of an occurrence (M. Deutsch, 1958, p. 
266), in this case, the non-defection of the other prisoner, which effectively solves the 
dilemma making cooperation the dominant strategy.2  While it did not articulate any explicit 
connection to international politics of the day, the article formulated hypotheses - concerning 
the role of communication, power, and the third parties in establishing or hindering the 
development of trust – which were imminently applicable to the international arena. 
A more explicit attempt to consider the role of trust in specifically international 
questions, such as the formation and maintenance of alliances or the reliability of arms control 
agreements, came several years later from Bernhardt Lieberman (1964).  Lieberman was 
perhaps the first scholar to clearly identify what have become the two dominant views on trust 
in the study of international relations – one arguing that to trust is dangerous and states can ill 
                                                          
2 Importantly, Deutsch differentiates the expectation associated with trust from other types of 
expectations.  Deutsch notes that trust ‘leads to behavior which he [the actor] perceives to 
have greater negative motivational consequences if the expectation is not confirmed than 
positive motivational consequences if it is confirmed,’ where motivational consequences 
are defined as events that change, or prevent a change, in the welfare of the individual (M. 
Deutsch, 1958, p. 266). 
afford it, the other claiming that international conflicts are intractable because of the lack of 
trust.  He rejected the ‘personal-moral’ perspective on trust as impractical in international 
politics and instead put forward the notion of ‘trust based on interest’ (Lieberman, 1964, p. 
273).  Lieberman tried to coin the rather cumbersome ‘i-trust’ label, combining his notions of 
interest and trust, which did not catch on.  The conceptualization stressed the recognition of 
the necessity to ‘form a stable, continuing alliance, because such a situation often yields the 
greatest payoff to the members of the coalition.’ (Lieberman, 1964, p. 279)  Its emphasis on 
trusting and being trustworthy out of one’s own as well as the other’s interest makes 
Lieberman’s ideas similar to Russell Hardin’s well-known conceptualization of trust as 
encapsulated interest (Hardin, 2002).  
Lieberman’s thinking was novel in aligning the concept of trust with rational choice 
theory.  This move, however, likely accounts for the lack of interest in trust during the ensuing 
decades.  If there was no normative dimension to the concept, no personal or moral 
consideration, was it really necessary to operate with the concept of trust, instead of more 
sophisticated game-theoretical models demonstrating the preferred pay-off structures?  Thus 
perhaps the two most seminal works in international relations inspired by rational choice 
theory – Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation and Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony 
– despite exploring much the same questions, and even using some of the models applied by 
Deutsch and Lieberman, do not work with the concept of trust at all (Axelrod, 1990; Keohane, 
1984).3  Remarkably, Axelrod goes so far as to tout as one of the encouraging findings of his 
cooperation theory the fact that ‘there is no need to assume trust between the players.’ 
(Axelrod, 1990, p. 174)  
The rational choice conceptualization of trust received a major impetus from the work 
of Andrew Kydd beginning in the late 1990s.  Through a series of articles and a book, he 
became undoubtedly the most prominent rational choice theorist of trust within international 
relations.  Building on the work of sociologist James Coleman, Kydd defines trust in three ways 
throughout his work.  First, as the ‘estimate of how likely it is that the other is status quo 
oriented, rather than revisionist,’ (Kydd, 2001, p. 810).  This reflects the perennial concern in 
international politics whether states will be content with the existing world order,4 such as the 
United States in the post-Cold War period, or whether states will try to fundamentally change 
it, as for instance Germany’s attempt to do so between the two world wars.  The presence of 
revisionist states is bound with a greater likelihood of conflict precisely because their 
motivation to change the existing order makes them prone to defection and untrustworthy 
behaviour.  Second, trust for Kydd (2005, p. 3) is ‘a belief that the other side is trustworthy, 
that is, willing to reciprocate cooperation,’.  This touches on fundamental questions such as 
whether and how states might generate gains from mutually advantageous arrangements 
when simultaneously facing the possibility of cheating and defection.  The classical example is 
arms control negotiations and agreements, where both sides would benefit from limiting their 
military expenses, but must be alert to the other side gaining the upper hand in the 
                                                          
3 See also their joint-authored article (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985) 
4 See, for example, (Carr, 1939; Davidson, 2006; Johnston, 2003; Rynning & Ringsmose, 2008)   
relationship if it managed to circumvent the agreed restrictions.5  Finally, Kydd (2010, p. 2680) 
defines trust as ‘having confidence that one’s interests are not in too much conflict with the 
other side.’  Two states coveting the same territory, as is the case, for example, in the on-going 
territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea, are unlikely to trust each 
other.  Though all these definitions are somewhat different, what ties them together is the 
idea that trust is a rational prediction about the nature or characteristics of the other state, be 
they its status quo orientation, the willingness to reciprocate cooperation, or the compatibility 
of its interests.  In all instances, the importance of trust rests in its direct contribution to the 
success or failure of international cooperation.6   
Kydd’s main input is his conceptualisation of trust as relating to more than a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situation.  Instead of the narrow focus on that game, he proposes two complications.  
First, he adds uncertainty about the preferences of the other party into the calculation.  
Second, he argues that trust is not simply a belief about the probability that the other side will 
cooperate, but a belief about the preferences of the other side, be they either Prisoner’s 
Dilemma or Assurance Game preferences.7  A belief that the other state has Prisoner’s 
Dilemma preferences makes it untrustworthy, while a belief that the other state has Assurance 
Game preferences makes it trustworthy.  The importance of the distinction between a belief 
about the preferences of the other side instead of a belief about the mere probability of 
cooperation is that it helps to understand why even trustworthy actors sometimes fail to 
cooperate (Kydd, 2005, pp. 9-11).  As Kydd (2005, p. 11) puts it, ‘Hitler might think Britain the 
most trustworthy state in the world, and yet realize that the likelihood that Churchill will 
cooperate with him is zero.’   
From the rational choice perspective, the problem of mistrust at the international level 
therefore ultimately boils down to whether Assurance Game actors believe that the other side 
may have Prisoner’s Dilemma preferences (Kydd, 2005, pp. 6-8).  Kydd proceeds to define the 
level of trust that one actor has in relation to the other as the probability that the first actor 
assumes the other actor to be trustworthy.  Cooperation is possible only when the level of 
trust exceeds a minimum trust threshold for each party, which is defined as the range of 
probabilities of trust where the expected value of cooperation is positive (Kydd, 2005, p. 9).  
Crucially, in international politics this range is influenced by external factors.  For instance, in 
situations where the costs of conflict are high and the advantage of first strikes low, there will 
be a low minimum threshold of trust necessary for cooperation (Kydd, 2005, p. 41).  A good 
example is the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War once both sides secured the capability to retaliate to any nuclear strike launched by the 
other side.  The costs of conflict were extremely high, equalling practically to a total 
destruction, while the advantages of initiating a nuclear exchange were small, because the 
other side retained the ability to inflict massive damage. 
                                                          
5 See also (Kydd, 2012) Talbott 1995; Meyer Inter Security 1984; Adelman For Aff 1984;  
6 See also (Kydd, 2005-06, p. 620; 2010, p. 2676) 
7 Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the optimum strategy for both sides is to defect, in the 
Assurance Game, the optimum strategy is to cooperate if the other side is likely to 
cooperate, but to otherwise defect (Kydd, 2005, pp. 7-8). 
If states find themselves in a situation where large external pressures inhibit trust – 
Kydd calls this a noncooperative equilibrium – there is no possibility of cooperation because 
both security-seeking and revisionist states will do the same thing, defect.  These situations 
matter not only because they automatically produce defection, but also because it is 
impossible for Assurance Game actors to differentiate between Assurance Game and 
Prisoner’s Dilemma actors.  There is no possibility of learning the other’s type.  Alternatively, in 
a cooperative equilibrium, or what Kydd terms a separating equilibrium, the external 
conditions allow Assurance Game actors to cooperate, and therefore they can begin to 
distinguish the other’s type through the process of iterative learning (Kydd, 2005, p. 42).  Kydd 
showed the analytical purchase of this model in his examination of the end of the Cold War, 
where the United States and the Soviet Union were able to ‘get cooperation going by setting 
up an initial round to test the waters.’ (Kydd, 2005, p. 204)     
Kydd’s creative application of the rational choice definition of trust elucidates two 
fundamental problems of interstate relations: 1) under what structural conditions might states 
trust, and therefore cooperate; 2) how these structural conditions can affect the learning 
processes about other state’s type.  Despite these significant contributions, several questions 
arise.  Does the rational choice conceptualization of trust simply equate to cooperation?  In 
other words, is there a risk of misunderstanding the role of trust in international politics, 
because this model implies that where there is cooperation, there ought to be trust?  If this is 
the case, one might ask how does the concept trust advance the highly developed rational 
choice literature about cooperation?  Perhaps more importantly, is the rational choice 
conceptualization of trust powerful enough to disregard the potential social dynamics of trust 
in international relations?  States and their representatives are not fully rational actors in 
pursuit of the best pay-offs, irrespective of their efforts to convey such image (Mercer, 2013).  
It is, nevertheless, a testament to the contribution of the rational choice conceptualization of 
trust that these questions could not be posed without it. 
Trust as a Social Phenomenon 
The end of the Cold War brought a renewed emphasis on the role of ideas and social processes 
in the study of international relations.8  Crucial in this regard was the difficulty of explaining 
the waning of the superpower confrontation in the absence of any significant change in the 
underlying distribution of material capabilities between the competitors.  This was a surprising 
outcome, for major changes in international politics had long been expected to come as a 
result of an accumulation of resources followed by war.  The end of the Cold War led many 
observers to look for explanation beyond the pay-off matrices and material interests of states.  
Rather than holding on to the logic of expected consequences, where actors achieve 
cooperation by bargaining about the distribution of pay-offs on the basis of their pre-existing 
interests, scholars began to examine more seriously the role of the logic of appropriateness in 
the international system (March & Olsen, 1998).  This research emphasizes the relationship 
                                                          
8 This literature is known in the field as social constructivism. Major works include (Finnemore, 
1996; Hopf, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Kratochwil, 1991; Onuf, 1989; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 
1992, 1999). 
between rules and identities.  Cooperation is a result of compatible identities and behaviour 
following appropriate rules (March & Olsen, 1998, pp. 951-952).  Such a view of international 
politics provides important possibilities for the study of trust in relations among states, 
because it incorporates the social and relational dynamics between actors. 
Accordingly, scholars who study trust as a social phenomenon tend to begin their 
analyses by defining trust as confidence in expectations that others will ‘do what is right.’ 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 20)  They typically draw on seminal contributions to trust research such as 
those of Bernard Barber (1983), Martin Hollis (1998), or Eric Uslaner (2002).  The contrast with 
the rational choice position is stark.  The trustor is not merely a rational actor placing a bet on 
the behaviour of others, but proceeds on the belief that ‘trustees have a responsibility to fulfil 
the trust placed in them even if it means sacrificing some of their own benefits.’ (Hoffman, 
2002, p. 379)  Aaron Hoffman argues that this perspective, which he calls the fiduciary 
approach, distinguishes the concept of trust from the broader category of risk.  He notes the 
distinction is empirically justified, for we judge others as ‘upright’ or ‘honorable,’ and not just 
‘a good bet.’ (Hoffman, 2002, p. 381)  As Charles Kegley and Raymond Gregory stress in their 
exploratory study of trust in international alliances, ‘to keep peace, allies would be advised to 
keep promises.’ (Kegley & Raymond, 1990, p. 263)  
A similar position has been articulated by Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler who note 
the rational choice approach overlooks the human factor, or the ‘feelings and attachments’ 
that grow between leaders (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, pp. 145-158).  A typical example is the 
relationship between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid- to late-1980s, which is 
said to have facilitated the peaceful end of the Cold War.  Nicholas Wheeler (2010) later 
applied the same lenses to the ultimately unsuccessful trust-building process between India’s 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Pakistani opposite Nawaz Sharif.  Both instances 
highlight the personal and emotional basis of trust, the critical role of the ‘leap in the dark’ 
involved in trusting, and the idea that trust is an on-going two-way relationship (Booth & 
Wheeler, 2008, p. 232).   
The expectation others will do what is right, however, does not automatically bind 
those being trusted to particular actions.  Trust is relational precisely because no matter what 
one does, it cannot be imposed on others.  In trust research, this argument is articulated by 
Claus Offe (1999, p. 43), who cautions that trust ‘cannot easily be brought into being through 
strategic action’.  Within the context of the study of international politics, Aaron Hoffman 
likewise argues that, while ‘trustors create trusting relationships; trustees determine the 
success of these relationships.’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 22)   
Taking both risk and obligation into account, the behavioural manifestation of trust is 
what Hoffman (2002, p. 377) calls a trusting relationship.  This concept presupposes a social 
structure, where actors interact in more or less dense webs of meaning.  As such, trusting 
relationships must include not only the idea of risk, but also the idea of obligation (Hoffman, 
2002, p. 376).  Additionally, social trust theorists interpret the act when trustors place their 
trust in trustees less as an outcome of ‘the certainty produced when actors bind themselves to 
particular outcomes,’ but more as stemming ‘out of an essential faith.’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 7)  It 
seems to us, however, that scholars of international relations favouring the notions of the 
‘leap’ or ‘faith’ would be better served by following Guido Möllering’s concept of suspension.  
Suspension, conceived ‘as the process that enables actors to deal with irreducible uncertainty 
and vulnerability’, serves the same function as the leap of faith (Möllering, 2006, p. 110).  But 
it is based on a combination of ‘reason, routine, and reflexivity’, all of which are more likely to 
appeal to policy- and decision-makers who typically strive to project the image of rational and 
calculating actors who are not swayed by emotions. 
Similarly to Hoffman’s use of obligation, Ruzicka and Wheeler, in what they call a 
binding approach to trust, focus on the centrality of promises and their role in establishing and 
maintaining a trusting relationship.  They argue that in such a relationship actors will honour 
their promises even if they have something to gain from defecting, based on the fact that ‘they 
value both its existence and continuation.’ (Ruzicka & Wheeler, 2010, p. 73)  This allows 
Ruzicka and Wheeler to explain the persistence of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) 
despite the fact that it created massive power and status disparities between the five 
recognized nuclear weapon states and all the other signatories who agreed to forego the 
acquisition of atomic weapons.    
The analytical contribution of conceptualizing trust with as a belief that the other will 
“do what is right” is significant.  It enables observers to identify trusting relationships with a 
greater degree of precision.  For instance, from the rationalist perspective the nuclear 
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War could be 
understood as trusting since both countries predicted that the other would not launch their 
nuclear weapons under conditions of uncertainty (Hoffman, 2002, p. 379).  However, the 
absurdity of classifying that relationship as trusting is readily apparent, given the extent of 
hostility and animosity which it entailed.  Conceptualizations of trust based merely on 
predictability of actions simply cannot differentiate between trust and other factors such as 
coercion or deterrence, which might also encourage actors to take risks.  As Hoffman (2002, p. 
381) puts it, ‘trust implies risk, but risk-taking does not necessarily imply trust.’  By introducing 
the notions of obligation or bond, scholars can differentiate between trust and the broader 
category of risk. 
The concept of trusting relationship is also explored by Keating and Ruzicka (2014), 
who use it to demonstrate the difference between the concepts of trust and confidence.  
Drawing on the work of Niklas Luhmann, specifically his contention that trust allows actors to 
cognitively reduce or eliminate the overall amount of risk and uncertainty, Keating and Ruzicka 
(2014, p. 2)  pose a crucial question for the students of international politics: ‘How can one 
identify a trusting relationship between two states?’  To answer the question, they propose to 
focus on whether and how states adopt or decline hedging strategies vis-à-vis other states.  To 
have a trusting relationship leads states not to hedge against the potentially negative 
consequences of other’s actions, because such actions are cognitively considered to be zero 
within a trusting relationship.  They argue that the assessment of the intentions of the other 
state, found in both rationalist and some social theorists of trust, should properly be labelled 
confidence.  The important difference between these two concepts is that, ‘confidence does 
not reduce the perception of risk, trust does.’ (Keating & Ruzicka, 2014, p. 4)  This approach 
carries two advantages when analysing trusting relationships.  First, it offers the opportunity to 
examine them without relying either on actors’ assertions or the logically convoluted notions 
of a ‘leap of faith’ or the ‘acceptance of vulnerability’.  Second, it opens up the possibility of 
process-tracing the formation of such relationships over longer periods of time.  Therefore, it 
takes seriously the habitual nature of trust underpinning the social approach.9 
However, the question of how much the social approach adds to the rationalist 
understanding of trust remains.  Various authors might claim that the social aspect of trust is 
important, but does this merely add to the value of the trusting relationship in the calculation 
of the actors?  For instance, despite stressing the importance of social obligation, Hoffman still 
falls back on the trustors’ perceptions of the trustees to fulfil the obligation, just like a 
rationalist scholar would.  The difference is the nature of the obligation itself.  States trust 
because they ‘have the belief that their trustees are obliged to fulfil their trust’ and that 
‘trustworthy individuals are those deemed likely to uphold the obligations that our trust 
bestows upon them.’ (Hoffman, 2006, p. 22) 
The connection between the rationalist and social camps is perhaps most apparent in 
the work of Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler.  Their conceptualization of trust spans both the 
rationalist and social approaches, moving between trust as predictability and trust as a bond.  
Thus, a minimalist conception of trust is the belief based on the mutual interpretation of each 
other’s behaviour that the other state can be relied upon not to act in ways that will be 
injurious to the interests or values of the first state.  A maximalist conception of trust, on the 
other hand, becomes apparent when actors mutually attempt to promote each other’s values 
and interests (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 229).  Though Booth and Wheeler attempt to link the 
two approaches, it is unclear from their explanation how trust can be transformed from an 
expectation to a personal bond.  Nicholas Wheeler’s most recent work emphasizes the role of 
empathy developed between top policy-makers during face-to-face summits (Wheeler, 2013).   
While interpersonal communication is clearly central to the process of empathizing, it remains 
to be established whether this is a more generally valid explanation of interstate trust-
building.  
The questions concerning a coherent conceptualisation of trust notwithstanding, 
Booth and Wheeler make an important contribution in their emphasis on the fact that trust, 
even in international politics, can be present and operate at several levels.  For instance, trust 
might only exist at the elite level between leaders, as when the process of the Franco-German 
reconciliation began in the 1950s and 1960s, or it might become embedded widely within 
political units when trusting relationships are replicated at the broad societal levels, as when 
the same process of reconciliation continued in the decades after (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 
230).  In this regard, Booth and Wheeler introduce to the study of trust among states the 
perennial problem of the levels of analysis (Singer, 1961), something that trust researchers 
ought to take seriously.  
Trust as a Psychological Phenomenon 
The question of the appropriate level of analysis is of fundamental importance to the final 
                                                          
9 The use of habitual thinking as a theoretical tool to understand international relations is a 
recent phenomenon, see (Hopf, 2010) 
approach to the study of trust in international politics, which treats trust as psychological 
phenomenon.  In the interplay between agents and structures, scholars adopting this line of 
inquiry favour the individual actors who act on behalf of collective units such as states.  They 
argue that the rational approach, and to a lesser degree also the social approach, miss the key 
point of trust, which is how its psychological dimension produces particular effects.  
Psychological predispositions and emotions of actors therefore take a prominent role and 
must be investigated with regard to the formation and maintenance of trust between 
individuals acting on the international stage.  Such research is nested within a broader 
approach to international politics, which stresses the significance of psychological factors 
shaping perceptions, judgments, and decisions (Jervis, 1976; Mercer, 1996).   
The idea of treating trust in international politics as a psychological phenomenon was 
first developed in depth by Deborah Welch Larson in her analysis of the US-Soviet relations 
during the Cold War.  Published in the late 1990s, her book foreshadowed the wave of interest 
in the study of trust within the field of international relations.  While Larson begins with a 
rational choice framework by explicitly borrowing her conceptualization of trust from 
economists - trust is the ‘subjective probability that the other will perform an action upon 
which the success of one’s own decision depends and in a context where one must decide 
before the other’s behavior can be monitored,’ (Larson, 1997, p. 12) - she adds a psychological 
dimension, arguing that trust is different from mere expectations for two reasons.  First, trust 
creates a sense of regret in the poor decision, not just mere disappointment.  Second, 
misplaced trust generates a moral outrage not present in decisions driven purely from rational 
expectations (Larson, 1997, p. 19).  From the psychological perspective trust includes 
predictability, credibility, and good intentions.  
Curiously, Larson demonstrates the importance of trust negatively, by tracing several 
instances where mistrust prevented cooperation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, even when they shared interests and preferences.  Deploying the counterfactual 
method, she shows how trust, as opposed to mistrust, would have made a difference in their 
various dealings.  Additionally, she demonstrates how mistrust was rooted in ideological 
beliefs, cognitive biases, and historical narratives, which made it extremely difficult to 
overcome entrenched perceptions.  To trust, actors must interpret others’ actions and such 
interpretations are impossible without psychological factors such as beliefs and images.  This 
further reinforces the importance of individuals when it comes to the study of trust in 
international politics.    
Another group of scholars study trust from an individual psychological perspective, but 
do so by focussing on the link between emotions and trust.  Jonathan Mercer (2005, p. 95), for 
instance, argues that trust is ‘a feeling of optimism in another’s goodwill and competence.’  
This feeling goes beyond the observable evidence presented to an agent, where ‘people give 
the benefit of the doubt to those they trust, and doubt anything beneficial done by those they 
distrust.’ (Mercer, 2005, p. 95)  Drawing on social identity theory, Mercer claims that identity 
produces an emotion that creates trust, which then can be used to solve collective action 
problems.  It is this strong feeling of group identity that leads to cooperation, sharing, the 
perception of the mutuality of interests, and a willingness to sacrifice particular individual 
interests for group interests.   
Mercer (2005, p. 96) argues that trusting individuals will cooperate even when they 
know that others within the identity group are defecting, and will not leave the group even if it 
is in their interest to do so.  But the benefit of the link between identity and trust that 
stabilises these relationships also creates problems.  If trust relies on identity, then this could 
lead to an automatic discrimination between insiders and outsiders.  As Mercer (2005, p. 97) 
puts it, ’in-group trust does not require out-group distrust - which is a feeling of pessimism 
about another’s goodwill and competence - but it does require one to distinguish between 
trusting one’s group and not trusting an out-group.’10  Recognising the role of emotion in trust 
might help us to understand how distinct groups form larger collectives, such as security 
communities whose members share a ‘we-feeling’, and why trusting relationships form so 
rarely (Mercer, 2005, pp. 97-98).   
Booth and Wheeler, drawing on Mercer, offer a way of addressing the in-group vs. 
out-group problem.  They note that one of the characteristics of trust is empathy and bonding, 
or actors’ ability to ‘internalise the hopes and fears of another by imaginatively taking on as far 
as possible their emotions/feelings and psychological realities,’ particularly an ability to 
empathise with fear (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 237).  Naomi Head (2012, pp. 37-38) likewise 
argues that decisions to trust are not purely rational. Some decisions to trust against the odds, 
or distrust despite the odds, can be explained by examining the emotions underlying the 
situation.  She suggests two potential sources of change leading to trusting relationships - 
either new evidence as to the type of actor one is facing becomes available, or, crucially in the 
psychological context, actors consciously exercise empathy (Head, 2012, p. 38).  The ability to 
empathise with the fear of others opens up the door to the creation of trusting relationships.   
A different take on the emotional character of trust is put forward by Torsten Michel 
(Michel, 2013).  Following the argument of Bernd Lahno (2001), he claims that scholars of 
international relations should distinguish between reliance (strategic trust) and trust 
(moralistic trust).  In this view, calculative interactions are best characterized as reliance, 
whereas trust is ‘a moralistic, emotive attitude.’ (Michel, 2013, p. 870)  Michel argues that 
trust forms part of practical knowledge which serves as background to actors’ actions.  
Because of this emotive, dispositional quality towards others, instances of misplaced trust 
result in feelings of betrayal rather than mere disappointment.  Whereas the argument makes 
for a decisive critique of trust-building efforts - ‘re-establishing trust cannot be engineered’ 
(Michel, 2013, p. 883) - additional application to international politics is not apparent and 
remains yet to be worked out. 
One way of doing so is suggested in the rich work of Brian Rathbun, who argues that 
psychology is important because it shapes statespersons’ general propensity to trust in 
others.11  Thus, while he keeps a rationalist definition of trust as the ‘belief that cooperation 
                                                          
10 This idea has also been studied empirically by Karin Fierke (2009), who tries to show on the 
case of Northern Ireland how exclusive identity categories hamper the possibility of 
establishing trust. 
11 We refer to Rathbun’s book which largely summarizes his findings presented in a series of 
preceding articles, (Rathbun, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a) 
will be reciprocated,’ (Rathbun, 2012b, p. 2) he shows how actors who tend to view others as 
untrustworthy favour unilateralism in foreign policy, whereas those generally inclined to trust 
are more willing to advocate multilateralism.  In other words, Rathbun (2012b, p. 3) is 
interested in the phenomenon of ‘generalised’ trust, which is produced by the disposition of 
the statesperson, and how it is differentiated from strategic trust. 
Working closely with Eric Uslaner’s research, Rathbun (2012b, pp. 24-25) claims that 
generalised trust is ‘moralistic’, because it is based on an assessment of the general 
benevolent character and honesty of others, and not simply an assessment of their interests.  
Trust is ‘ideological in nature, rooted in a broader worldview about the nature of social 
relations.’  (Rathbun, 2012b, p. 3)  Generalised trusters tend to create international institutions 
with more binding commitments, less flexibility and more members, unlike generalised non-
trusters who will prefer limited commitments, vetoes and opt-out clauses (Rathbun, 2012b, p. 
6).  Rathbun notes that in the United States, generalised trusters and non-trusters can be 
roughly mapped onto the social psychology of the left and the right.  This offers an answer to 
why some states have Prisoner’s Dilemma preferences and others Assurance Game 
preferences, a question unresolved in Andrew Kydd’s work.  Variation in generalised trust 
means that different political actors can see their strategic environment quite differently 
though they find themselves in the same situation (Rathbun, p. xiii). 
This finding is important because without the notion of generalised trusters it is 
difficult to understand why cooperation in multilateral settings would start in the first place.  
The presence of generalised trusters answers the questions of how and why states initiate 
cooperation without adequate information about the other states, and how they sustain 
cooperation amidst inconsistent behaviour or when interactions are infrequent.  It also 
explains why large international organisations keep functioning given an almost certain 
divergence of interests among states and explains diffuse reciprocity over time (Rathbun, 
2012b, pp. 17-19).  For example, Rathbun’s case studies elucidate why the United States 
stayed outside of the League of Nations after World War I as well as why the United States 
took an active part in shaping the United Nations and NATO following World War II.    
Conceptualizing trust as a psychological phenomenon makes intuitive sense even in 
international politics.  After all, states and organizations are represented by individual human 
beings who trust or distrust their counterparts and interlocutors.  The role of high ranking 
officials is clearly important independent of prevailing social structures, particularly if they can 
successfully break the current framing of the issue through their agency.12  Nevertheless, a 
question remains as to whether the psychological approaches discount the structural 
constraints that individuals in these roles face both domestically and internationally. 
                                                          
12 Agency is fundamental in any social understanding because, as Roy Bhaskar (1979, p. 174) 
put it, ‘nothing happens in society save in virtue of something human beings do or have 
done.’ 
The Future of Trust Research in International Relations 
Which directions, then, should the study of trust in international relations take in the future?  
Individual researchers will maintain a range of original venues to examine and we do not wish 
to prescribe any common agenda.  However, we would like to outline three broad areas that 
we believe deserve the particular attention of trust researchers in the field of international 
relations and beyond - the processes of trust-building; the ways in which it could be 
demonstrated whether bilaterally, regionally, or even globally trusting relationships are 
becoming more/less robust; and finally the normative desirability of trusting relationships 
among states. 
Much of the increased profile that the study of trust has received in international 
relations is the product of practitioner interest in conflict resolution.  Although major wars 
between great powers might be the thing of the past due to the effect of nuclear weapons and 
the increased destructiveness of conventional armaments, the use of force to solve political 
disputes has not abated.  Whether trust can be built among adversaries and, if so, how, is a 
question of great importance.  Is Torsten Michel’s scepticism about trust-building processes 
warranted or can conditions conducive to such processes be uncovered in the ways envisaged 
by Nicholas Wheeler?  We need carefully articulated hypotheses – is it the case, for example, 
that accepting vulnerability can build trust? – and well-designed studies, be they individual, 
large-N, or comparative, to test what has long been uncritically accepted by most scholars of 
trust in international relations.  Evidence supporting the idea that trust can be actively built is 
scarce and anecdotal rather than systematic.  Do model instances such as Anwar Sadat’s trip to 
Jerusalem, or the interaction between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, tend to discount 
the presence of various safety nets which significantly lessened the ascribed vulnerability 
faced by actors and states which they represented?  On the more conceptual side, those 
interested in trust-building should say clearly what actually characterizes a process of trust-
building.  All too frequently, such processes are merely equated with increased cooperation.  
But, especially from the point of view of social and psychological approaches, cooperation 
alone cannot be enough to signify a trusting relationship. 
Closely related to the previous point is the need to devise better tools for identifying 
trusting relationships and their robustness.  As Keating and Ruzicka ask, how do we know 
something is a trusting relationship to begin with?  Signs of cooperation and actors’ 
proclamations have inherent limits.  The former can be achieved without trust; the latter can 
simply be self-deceptions or, worse, lies.  The need to identify trusting relationships is 
important because, once achieved, scholars can start to think in a systematic manner about 
questions concerning how trust between states might be generated or maintained.13  Until 
then, we do not actually know whether we are dealing with the relevant cases.  We might be 
trying to learn about apples while examining oranges.  Keating and Ruzicka propose to focus 
on the extent of hedging strategies adopted by states.  This indicator has broad applicability 
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there are at least several competing models and an active academic debate over their 
strengths and weaknesses. 
and could be used in bilateral, regional as well as global settings.  Though the most obvious 
way how to conceive hedging is in terms of military preparedness and expenditure, hedging 
strategies could be operationalized in a number of ways.  But, critically, does their approach 
rely too much on material indicators?   
The identification of trusting relationships is also important to the research on security 
communities, that is, groups of states among whom war is unthinkable.   Although the existing 
literature references trust as a variable, it subsumes trust as part of the mutual identity that 
forms between states in a security community.  Scholars might want ask is the question 
whether trust should be studied independently of identity formation.14  In other words, do the 
formation and strengthening of trusting relationships precede the construction of the ‘we-
feeling’ characteristic of a security community?  If so, this would contribute to the recent 
debates over whether there exist interstate relationships that have the properties of security 
communities but lack the ‘we-ness’ central to the original theory (Pouliot, 2007).  More 
importantly, it would mean that heterogeneous groups could form a global security 
community where war between all states becomes unthinkable. 
The research on security communities could serve as methodological inspiration in the 
study of the robustness of trusting relationships.  The research here could take two forms.  On 
the one hand, trust researchers might deploy the tools examining frequency, density and 
content of communication networks, as laid out by Karl Deutsch, who is inextricably linked 
with the concept of security community (K. W. Deutsch et al., 1957).  Alternatively, there are 
methods connected with the study of security communities as everyday practices, notably 
explored by Vincent Pouliot (2008).  In either case, it is desirable to have indicators allowing us 
to make claims about the existence and quality of trusting relationships across time. 
Trust scholars in international relations should also examine complex relationships 
where trust varies across different issue areas.  For instance, two states might have a high level 
of trust in their strategic partnership, but far less in their economic relations.  The example of 
the relationship between the United States and Japan springs to mind here.  Does a change in 
the level of trust in one area spill over to others?  Is it the case that trusting relationships need 
to be formed in some areas first before they can be established elsewhere?  Empirically, this 
might be an interesting research topic for European integration scholars.   
Finally, scholars studying trust at the international level should not shy away from fully 
exploring the question of the normative desirability of trust in interstate relations.  To 
compensate for the traditional dismissal of trust, the recent wave of scholarship has tried to 
demonstrate the possibility and appeal of trust.  The normative case for the development of 
trusting relationships is strong, precisely because some of the most pressing problems facing 
humanity require solutions that cannot be adopted without trust.  Moreover, whatever 
arrangements states agree on to tackle such issues as climate change or resource depletion 
might depend on more than interpersonal bonds of trust between leaders.  Measures will take 
years to adopt and will have to be maintained for decades, spanning well beyond the time-
frame of most office holders in most states.  Under those conditions, trusting relationships will 
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need to be formed between collectivities.  The case for the normative desirability of at the 
interstate levels cannot be based merely on empirical illustrations.  A full-fledged normative 
argument grounded in a general view of international politics is required.  It is possible that it 
will show that the degree of enthusiasm for trust in international politics needs to be toned 
down.  Such a finding, however, would not be a reason to abandon the study of trust and 
trusting relationships in international politics.  On the contrary, it would allow trust 
researchers to explore the subject with a better sense of limitations and the promise it holds.    
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